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"Nothing personal... 
But you just don't fit in here." 
Multi-Union 
Organizing 
• Speech by David Sickler 
12/7/95 of UCLA 
Multi-union organizing is my favorite subject. As a regional director of 
the AFL-CIO, I have to spin a lot of plates in the air, but organizing is 
the thing that I'm interested in the most. It's what I volunteered to do 
as an activist member of my own local union back in the 60s. And for 
many years it's the key thing I have felt is missing in the whole national 
labor movement agenda. Not just in the AFL-CIO, but as a priority for 
all of our international unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO. So the ques-
tion that is central for the labor movement right now is—Can unions 
work together? 
My gut reaction to that question is—they have no choice. They have 
to work together, and at a level they never have before. They have to 
go back to the days when the struggle to put food on the table was the 
major objective. Just to scratch out some kind of meager existence for 
dignity was the priority for organizing. 
But before we can answer "Can unions work together?" we have to 
ask why the hell unions are where they are right now? Why are they, 
we, in a declining mode? Why is it that there's this crying need out 
there to lift workers up out of poverty? Yes, full-time workers are sink-
ing under the poverty level. Why? I mean, they have this instrument 
for change—Unions!—Why isn't it working? 
• David Sickler is the director of the AFL-CIO Region VI, which consists of California, 
Nevada, and Hawaii. 
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It's not working because unions are trying to make change by fol-
lowing the old model established by federal law. I'm talking about the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). That's the law that governs what 
we do. And it's the law that established the procedure. So we're caught, 
as the labor movement, in this vicious circle. On the one hand, we've 
known for many years that the law doesn't work. It encourages workers 
to organize and engage in collective bargaining, but there is no enforce-
ment procedure behind the law. In order to get enforcement you have 
to go outside the NLRA to a whole other system of justice, the court 
system. Then you get backlogged with everybody else. Then the games 
begin, and in some cases it can take 6, 8,20, sometimes 25 years before 
you achieve justice. 
Prior to the 1980s and the examples set by Ronald Reagan, employ-
ers were not as aggressive in all-out union busting. When I got involved 
in the 60s, it was the heyday of the labor movement. In the 60s we were 
living off the postwar boom of the 50s with about 35 percent organized 
in the country. We were the King Kong of the worldwide economy. 
There was massive growth, and it was contained within the borders of 
the United States. Sure, we had our struggles, but basically industry 
and government had accepted labor as a necessary evil in society. We 
were receiving some of the rewards for that and we were growing by 
leaps and bounds. 
What happened in the 50s and the 60s—and this is something a lot 
of people don't understand—is that when you're that well organized, 
and you have established some kind of average of wages, benefits, and 
working conditions, you become a threat to the non-union employers 
out there. They're constantly thinking, "I must keep my wages up close 
to those unionized wages, because if I don't, those union guys will be 
over here organizing my business. I'll throw in a few crumbs—just 
enough to keep the wolves away from the door." The effect was that 
even though we were only 35 percent organized, unions were having a 
drastic effect on the non-union sector. Unions were making a difference. 
For example, when I came to California in 1976, every major auto-
mobile factory in America was based here. General Motors. Dodge. 
Ford. They were all here. All the major rubber companies were here. 
All the major steel companies were here. These huge corporations 
employed thousands of workers, and they were good paying union jobs. 
And other corporations were following their lead. Then the plant clo-
sures of the late 70s and early 80s hit. One by one they shut down and 
they left .town, and nothing replaced them except McDonald's, Burger 
King, Carl's Junior, and the drug industry. 
The same thing happened across the country. By an overwhelming 
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majority, these were unionized companies that shut down. We lost 
close to a million unionized workers almost overnight. Now the unions' 
response to this was, "We have to organize to try to replace what we've 
lost." And there was this frantic effort to go out and try to organize. You 
have to put yourself in the mind-set of the unions involved with these 
massive losses. They're hemorrhaging resources when they lose mem-
bers to that degree. Look at the United Auto Workers, the Machinists, 
the Steelworkers—they each lost 50 percent of their numbers. In one 
fell swoop they lost almost as many as they had gained in 1937 when 
the CIO, under Phillip Murray, went out and organized steel compa-
nies nationwide. The question is, why? What changed so drastically 
from the 30s to the late 70s and early 80s? 
CHANGES IN THE NLRB 
In that 40-year period the rules of the game changed. Most notice-
ably, the law changed. In the early days, starting with the National 
Recovery Act and then the National Labor Relations Act in its early 
stages, unions had a lot more muscle and flexibility. They could run sec-
ondary boycotts. They could use that muscle to do all kinds of things 
to lean on industry and force them to comply. Then the passage of Taft-
Hartley (1947), Landrum-Griffin (1957), and a number of Supreme 
Court decisions handcuffed the labor movement. By the 1980s, with 
their hands tied behind their backs, there was very little unions could 
do to respond. Despite this history, the National Labor Relations Act 
was, and to a great degree still is, the model under which most of our 
unions organize. That's what we have to change. 
Let me stop for a second and interject a current example of how the 
Act doesn't work. The Act says that employers have to sit down and bar-
gain fairly—a very broad, generalized kind of statement. And it sets out 
penalties for what happens to a company or employees if they don't 
"bargain fairly" under the Act. Simple enough, right? Well, in Las Vegas 
there's the Frontier Hotel & Casino strike, maybe you've heard of it. 
It's over four years old. One hundred percent of the workers voluntar-
ily went on strike. One hundred percent of the workers, to this day, are 
still on strike against this company. Why? Because over a period of two 
years of negotiation, this company unilaterally took away the health 
benefits and pension the workers had—a clear violation of the law— 
and the employer refused to bargain. Just said, "That's it. We're tak-
ing it away. Finished. It's over." 
The workers went out on strike. After four years of strike, the National 
Labor Relations Board ruled that it is an unfair labor practice strike. In 
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YOU MUST BARGAlM UllTH 
THEUMIDN... 
THAT'S W E LAW/ 
labor terminology an " un-
fair labor practice strike" 
is probably the best deci-
sion you can get. Because 
what it means is that the 
employer has to hire back 
all those people and back-
pay them for every day 
they were out on strike. 
Well, there's one little 
kink in this whole process. 
The Act itself doesn't 
have the legal right to 
enforce its own decisions. 
Now the decision has to 
go through the civil courts 
because the employer's 
appealing. So we have 
one law, two legal sys-
tems, and situation after 
situation that take 8,15, 
25 years to get through 
the legal process of find-
ing justice for workers 
who strike. 
The reason I bring this 
up is that the Frontier 
Hotel strike is very 
unique—it 's not the 
norm. Las Vegas is an expanding town and there are lots of other jobs 
to find. The union is providing $200 a week in strike support. Every 
international union that ever holds a convention in Las Vegas offers 
moral support by walking that picket line. To top it off, the former 
owner of Circus Circus, Bill Bennett, sided with the strikers at the time, 
bought a catering truck and, to this day, still feeds the strikers three meals 
a day. 
The fact remains, however, that the owner of the Frontier Hotel & 
Casino, no matter how blatantly she has violated the law to its worst 
extreme, is getting away with it. She's getting away with it, and she'll 
continue to get away with it for as long as she wants to drag it through 
the legal process. The workers in the meantime have learned a very 
bloody, very serious lesson. In this system, in this country, if you take 
, . , B U f YOU CAM WAIT 
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on an employer and they want to fight you with every legal maneuver 
they have, they can stall you and freeze you and starve you to death in 
terms of your ultimate goal. This situation sends out a very strong mes-
sage to other workers: "You want to organize your place? Look at the 
Frontier. That's what they can do to you." That's the message. And 
that message is repeated in every state and every city across this nation 
when you try to organize under the National Labor Relations Act. 
The problem with the Act is that it runs absolutely contrary to how 
we built this movement in the first place. The Act was very important. 
Millions of workers signed up after its passage. The problem is we 
thought that the passage of the Act was the key, and not the changes 
in Supreme Court decisions and the amendments to it since its pas-
sage. Most of our labor movement still thinks that's the model they 
have to follow. You know what the average win rate is under NLRB elec-
tions? It's about 45 percent. 
International unions talk organizing, they pass resolutions at their con-
ventions about organizing, but they don't put money, resources, and 
staff into it. Because they know. They know the odds are against not 
only winning the election, the odds are against getting a contract. So 
they have a choice—try to organize against the odds or use their staff 
to service the hell out of the members they've got. On top of all this, 
they're piled up in negotiations. Multiply this by all our international 
unions across the country, and you have a picture of unions closing 
ranks, a labor movement closing ranks. 
The problem with the NLRB model is that the focus is on the elec-
tion. All the energy's there. It's what we call "targeting the ballot box" 
not the bargaining table. In order to succeed, for workers, the bottom 
line is the quality of the contract you deliver. Is it going to contain bet-
ter wages? Is it going to contain the foundation for growth? Are you 
going to be able to build on the contract that you establish in that first 
round of negotiations? 
At one point in the early 80s only 15 percent of the contracts survived. 
Why? Because some unions were signing lousy agreements for that first 
contract, just to get their foot in the door. Some of these were so bad 
they didn't provide better wages. In some cases they didn't even pro-
vide for a grievance procedure. So workers were paying dues for basi-
cally nothing. And then the company worked on these people as though 
there was a continuous organizing campaign, and they decertified the 
union. This was the model. 
Not all unions reacted this way. Some took the challenge and were 
aggressive. They grabbed the reins and went all out. They said, "The 
hell with it." They're the ones that grew in spite of the fact that the law 
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that governs organizing and collective bargaining is a failure. They grew, 
and taught us a lesson about how to do it. How to go under, around, 
and over the obstacles. How to succeed. 
TRYING TO GO BEYOND THE NLRB: 
ORGANIZING BY INDUSTRY 
Now Southern California's done some amazing things within the last 
ten years. Starting with SEIU 399 and the Justice for Janitors campaign. 
Instead of going after companies in the old NLRB style, they decided 
to go after the whole damn industry. It was a bold, risky venture, but it 
worked. It worked for the same reasons other campaigns like it had 
worked in wholly different industries. It worked because it energized 
not only the workers, but the community. 
On June 15, 1990, it all came to a head in Century City. And I had 
the distinct honor to be with the janitors in that march in Century City 
when the LAPD sealed off the intersection and attacked us. I was an 
eyewitness to it, and so was NBC, and they broadcast all over the coun-
try—the clubbing of immigrant workers. What happened as a result of 
that? The entire labor movement responded. Within two weeks nego-
tiations were going on in Chicago, Illinois, and a master agreement was 
signed for immigrant workers. Now I'm somebody who's tried to orga-
nize immigrant workers in this town for 20 years. We've had some suc-
cess here and there, but the movement's never been able to prove to 
immigrant workers that it could deliver. That it could put its money 
where its mouth was. 
Immigrant workers have always agreed with us philosophically. They 
know we're advocates; they know we're on their side. But they've been 
reluctant to get on board with us on a large scale because they've watched 
our failures. They know that some of our own unions in the past, when 
they'd go out and organize companies that had immigrant workers, if 
those workers went on strike and the employer replaced them with other 
immigrant workers, the union would call the INS and have the scab 
workers deported. The employer would then call the INS and have the 
strikers deported. That's a great deal for immigrant workers. Welcome! 
Welcome to the institutions of the United States. But the labor move-
ment changed its act in the 70s and the 80s, and we aren't doing those 
kinds of things any more. Still, these workers just weren't sure we could 
deliver. What happened with the signing of the Justice for Janitors con-
tract sent shockwaves through the immigrant community in Southern 
California. It will never be the same, ever. Because about six months 
after the signing of that contract, 900 workers at American Racing 
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Equipment in Rancho Domingas—and I'm telling you it's 100 percent 
immigrant—staged a five-day walkout. 
Now, I'm an organizer. I'm gonna tell you, 900 workers do not spon-
taneously walk out of a plant. There's some leadership in there some-
where. There's some organizing going on. You hear about hot-shop 
organizing? This was a super, super red-hot shop. These people orga-
nized themselves. And, of course, this is a classic example of how we as 
a movement respond. The day after 900 workers at American Racing 
Equipment go out on the street in a wildcat by themselves, 97 unions 
are out there with their jackets and their leaflets. "Join us; I'm with the 
Office Workers!" "Join us; I'm with CWA!" "Join us; I'm with the Steel-
workers!" "Join us; I'm with the IUE!" "Join us; we're with UAW!" 
Well this is one of the roles that the Los Angeles-Orange County 
Organizing Committee (LAOCOC) played. We pulled all the unions 
together and said, "Stop this nonsense. You'll scare these workers off. 
They're gonna think you're all nuts. Let's sit down and talk about one 
union that has the best shot at organizing these people." After several 
weeks the unions decided that the Machinists had more resources, more 
staff, and was in a better position to go after them. Now this is mostly 
union organizing to some degree, although it's under a failed proce-
dure. Still, we went after American Racing, and won the election big. 
As a matter of fact, the Machinists had trouble keeping up with the lead-
ership of these workers. 
At American Racing there were labor leaders from Honduras, college 
educated people from El Salvador and Mexico. They're doing manual 
labor, but these were highly educated, highly skilled leadership types. 
And the Machinists were smart. They gave this local its own number, 
its own autonomy, and they elected their own leadership. The Machin-
ists amended their constitution to allow for this new immigrant local 
union. They got a good contract, and now they're working on their sec-
ond contract; it's a good contract. 
The American Racing Equipment campaign is about as good a suc-
cess as you can get under the Board. This was a National Labor Rela-
tions Act election. It doesn't get any better than this. It was the largest 
single group of workers we organized into the Board in 26 years . . . In 
26 years! And it was a mistake to do it that way. Anybody want to tell 
me why? Why would I say that the most obvious success in Los Ange-
les in 26 years was a mistake? It was a mistake because there are nine 
other wheel factories in Los Angeles with the same conditions and the 
same kind of workforce. 
You see what we did under the Board? There was fire in that plant. 
There was heat. There was emotion. There was anger. People wanted 
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to change things so bad they organized themselves and went into the 
street. You know what we did with that anger and that emotion and 
that momentum and that drive? We circled it and contained it. The 
steel campaign in the 30s wasn't about containing the struggle to one 
company of US Steel in one city in one state. It was about expanding 
the movement. It was about moving the movement forward. 
That's why American Racing Equipment was wrong. We shouldn't 
have contained it under the Board to that one location. Because Olympia 
Wheel, Western Wheel, and Superior Wheel all had the same condi-
tions. They all had basically the same wages and the same kind of work-
force. American Racing Equipment wasn't just a phenomenon that just 
happened to have labor leaders in its rank-and-file. A lot of these com-
panies had rank-and-file leadership waiting to be tapped. And our job 
is to provide the climate and the opportunity for them to surface and 
lead a movement. 
Now, the next campaign that was not an NLRB campaign but was 
about organizing the industry was the drywallers. How many here remem-
ber the drywall strike? Yeah, they struck from the Mexican border all 
the way up to Ventura. In the late 70s this industry paid wages of $10.50 
to $12.50 an hour, and they were organized under about three unions. 
By the time they decided to strike, these people were working 60 hours 
a week and making $250. No union. No insurance. No benefits. Treated 
like garbage. What did they have to lose? (See LRR #20.) 
I went down to meet with the strikers before adopting their strike. 
Not picking any one international union but targeting on this group of 
workers. This is the model some of us have been trying to establish for 
15 years. This is the kind of campaign we need in the garment indus-
try. I was the last one to think it would be the drywallers, or that this is 
where we would establish this kind of structure. We went out and we 
raised over a million dollars to support the strikers from San Diego to 
Ventura. They were out for six months, and they organized 75 percent 
of the drywall industry. Seventy-five percent of that industry is now 
union again. They're still not making top wages yet, but they're on their 
way now that they're union. 
PULLING THE LESSONS TOGETHER: 
A MULTI-UNION APPROACH TO ORGANIZING 
[There is a recent multi-union organizing initiative that has been 
seeking support from unions and community groups throughout L.A. 
That initiative is called the Los Angeles Machine Action Project 
(LAMAP).] LAMAP is about getting the unions to work together to 
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leverage their strength. Now we've had some horrible disasters as exam-
ples of multi-union efforts in the past. They can be top-down and square 
peg. They can take the 'build it at the International, take it to City X, 
and shove it down the throats of the local labor movement' approach. 
They can be all style, no substance sink holes that waste both time and 
resources. But they don't have to be. 
What we're looking at doing here, and why I'm spending so much 
more time on this than just the multi-union concept itself, is that before 
you have a multi-union effort, before you have any union effort, you 
have to have the right strategy. The importance here is the right strat-
egy. Why organizing succeeds and why it fails depends on how you 
frontload the campaign. Every effort has to go into one objective: con-
tract. I don't care how I organize the workers. I don't care how I get them, 
how I educate them, what process I get to. I have to understand where 
the Achilles heal is and how to leverage it. Without that, I take people 
down an unguided path. 
One of the guys who taught me to organize 30 years ago taught me 
the best lesson. It's more true today than it ever was before. He said, 
"If you can't help make workers' lives better, leave them the hell alone. 
Just leave them the hell alone. You'll just make things worse." That's 
got to be our number one mission today. Going into a campaign we gotta 
know the right target, the history of the target, and the Achilles heal of 
the target. Then we've got to leverage everything on it. So that the 
employer knows by the time we're through with him, that it's in his 
"Ipay $10 an hour... 
with $2 deducted for fighting union organizing drives." 
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best interest and the best interest of the peace of mankind and on earth 
to settle with us. Otherwise, it's Hell. All the odds are in our favor. 
When we organize with the old method, we put people in a vacuum. 
We take them out of what they're used to, and place them in a situa-
tion where they're under pressure from the employer. Over 95 percent 
of the employers in this country today that don't want to be organized 
will violate the law. We have the NLRB complaints to prove it. They're 
taught and trained to do it. That puts pressure on the workers, and 
when they finally go to the ballot box to vote under the NLRA they vote 
to relieve that pressure. Most of the them vote the pressure off. So we've 
learned that the way you organize isn't by putting people in a vacuum 
with all the pressure on them, subjected to a law that doesn't work. 
We have to organize in industries where we leverage. We have to 
focus all of our unions, all of our staff, all of our money, all of our brain 
power, and all of our research on one targeted sector. And then we just 
hit them like a swarm of locusts. We say, "Knock-knock, the union's 
here, and we're not leaving town until you settle. We're gonna make 
life miserable as Hell for you until you make life better for your work-
ers. And it's gonna be on a signed agreement. That's the way it is. We're 
gonna keep the light on you. And we're gonna bring in the church. And 
we're gonna bring in the community. And we're gonna bring in elected 
officials. And we're gonna bring in everybody, top-down on you. We're 
not gonna wait until we get in trouble with you at the bargaining table 
and then run after the church and say, Tlease help us.' They're gonna 
be with us when we come to meet you. They're gonna be with us when 
we talk to your workers." 
Now the incentive for the communities to join LAMAP is that they're 
starving to death. Workers who are making $5 an hour aren't paying 
enough taxes to support the communities they live in. But, if we lever-
age all of our collective muscle, and target one industry, imagine the 
possibilities.... We have 40 organizers, and within the industry several 
international unions and their resources, and the Catholic Church, and 
five or six community organizations, and four or five mayors from dif-
ferent cities where the workers live, and a couple of city councils, that's 
a lot of pressure. Whoa! I tell you, those fights don't last too long. • 
